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IN 1980,  I noted three characteristics  of the U.S. union  labor  market:  a 
tendency  for union  wage increases  to outpace  nonunion,  an insensitivity 
of wage decisions to real demand  conditions, and a gradual  erosion of 
the membership  base.1  In 1982,  as dramatic  developments  in the deter- 
mination  of union  wages began  to unfold, I reported  on a series of wage 
concessions that had been negotiated  in industries  as diverse as auto- 
mobile  manufacturing,  intercity  trucking,  and  meatpacking.2  Despite the 
widespread concessions, however, it was impossible at that time to 
detect any substantial  change in the union labor market  as described 
above. 
With an additional three years of  observation permitting firmer 
conclusions, I explore here an apparent  union wage norm shift and its 
implications  for wage determination  generally  over the next few years. 
Four basic points are made. First, union wage indexes have recently 
been rising at surprisingly  slow rates, given economic circumstances. 
Second, various  institutional  developments  in the union  sector reinforce 
the evidence of a wage norm shift. Third, the form of union wage 
concessions made  in the past few years suggests  that  future  union  wage 
growth  will be moderate  and somewhat  less responsive  to price  inflation 
than  it was in the past. Fourth,  the union  sector is large  enough  to affect 
aggregate wage indexes, even if no norm shift has occurred in the 
nonunion  sector. 
Union Wage Concessions 
The phenomenon  of union  wage concessions is not new. What  is new 
in the 1980s  is their  volume. As table 1 indicates, since 1982  substantial 
1. Daniel  J. B. Mitchell,  Unions, Wages,  and  Inflation  (Brookings,  1980). 
2. Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Recent Union Contract  Concessions," BPEA, 1:1982, 
pp. 165-201. 
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Table 1.  Proportion of Workers under Major Private Union Settlements with 
Concessions and with Substantial Real Wage Declines, 1959-85a 
Percent 
Proportion  of workers  Proportion  of workers 
CP1-W  with  freezes and cuts  with settlements  3.3 
inflation  Freezes  percentage  points 
rate  and cuts  Cuts  below CPI-W  inflation 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1959  1.5  3  0  0 
1960  1.5  4  0  0 
1961  0.7  7  0  0 
1962  1.2  22  0  0 
1963  1.6  25  0  0 
1964  1.2  5  0  0 
1965  1.9  4  0  0 
1966  3.4  1  0  1 
1967  3.0  1  0  0 
1968  4.7  0  0  0 
1969  6.1  1  0  1 
1970  5.5  0  0  0 
1971  3.4  1  0  1 
1972  3.4  3  0  3 
1973  8.8  1  0  41 
1974  12.2  1  0  39 
1975  7.0  4  0  9 
1976  4.8  4  0  6 
1977  6.8  2  0  9 
1978  9.0  2  0  31 
1979  13.4  4  0  52 
1980  12.5  0  0  50 
1981  8.7  8  5  13 
1982  3.9  44  2  45 
1983  3.3  37  13  37 
1984  3.5  23  5  25 
1985b  4.2  26  4  28c 
Source:  Current Wage Developments,  various issues. 
a.  Concessions  are first-year wage freezes  or cuts.  Estimates  in column 4 are based on interpolation.  Figures are 
rounded to the nearest whole  number. CPI-W inflation is on a December-to-December  basis,  except  1985, which is 
on a December-to-June  basis. 
b.  First six months. 
c.  Preliminary. 
fractions of workers under newly negotiated "major" private union 
contracts have had their first-year  wages frozen or cut. Because some 
workers  may have received more than one wage freeze or cut, it is not 
possible  to estimate  precisely  the proportion  of such  workers  experienc- Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  577 
ing at least one concession. However, the fraction  can be estimated  at 
between  one-third  and  one-half  under  alternative  assumptions.3 
Could  table  1  simply  reflect  the  recent  disinflation?  Since  price  inflation 
variables inevitably show strong explanatory power in wage-change 
studies,  perhaps  real  wage  freezes and  cuts are  to be expected in periods 
of low inflation, as the mean of the wage-change distribution  drifts 
downward.  In fact, the available  evidence does not bear out such an 
interpretation. 
The year  of lowest inflation  in the early 1980s  as measured  by the CPI- 
W,  the  consumerprice  index  for  urban  wage  earners  and  clerical  workers, 
was 1983.  A worker  experiencing  a wage freeze in that  year  would have 
suffered  a real  wage loss of 3.3 percent  as measured  by CPI-W.  Column 
4 of table 1 shows, for each year from 1959  to 1985, the proportion  of 
workers  with contracts  providing  first-year  basic wage adjustments  of 
3.3 percentage  points  below CPI-W  inflation. 
In the early 1960s,  when measured  inflation  was less than 2 percent, 
virtually  no workers received wage settlements 3.3 percentage  points 
below CPI-W. In two years, 1962  and 1963, significant  proportions  of 
workers under newly negotiated  contracts received wage freezes, but 
the low inflation  rate  ensured  that  their  real  wage loss was well under  3.3 
percent. Nor do productivity  growth  differences  appear  to be explana- 
tions  for  the differential  wage  performance  in  the two periods;  the growth 
rate of nonfarm  productivity  in 1962-63  was about  the same as in 1983- 
84. 
The only periods  before  the 1980s  in which substantial  proportions  of 
workers suffered such real wage losses  were those of accelerating 
3. An upper-limit  estimate  of the proportion  of workers  in the major  union  sector  who 
experienced  a wage  freeze or cut since 1979  can be made  by assuming  (incorrectly),  first, 
that no worker  experienced  more than one concession and, second, that the number  of 
workers  experiencing  concessions in each year reflected  the number  of workers  in that 
unit  as of 1984  as reported  in Current  Wage  Developments.  The first  assumption  leads to 
an  overstatement  of the  number  of workers  involved,  because  some  workers  did  experience 
more  than  one concession.  The second  assumption  tends  to overstate  the number  of union 
workers  experiencing  concessions, since union  membership  generally  fell in the private 
sector  during  the period  of concession-making.  (Note that  the word  "concession" is used 
interchangeably  with  "first-year  wage  freeze  or cut" throughout  this  paper.)  A lower-limit 
estimate  can be made by taking  only the two highest  consecutive years of concession- 
making  since 1979,  since  a worker  was unlikely  to be covered  by two concessions  in a two- 
year period,  and by using the larger  1983  base to compute  the fraction.  The upper-limit 
estimate  using the methodology  described  above is 49 percent,  and the lower limit  is 33 
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inflation,  such as 1973-74  and 1978-80. Thus, it appears  that until the 
early 1980s,  wage slippage  could largely  be attributed  to unanticipated 
inflation  and a lag in wage responsiveness to price developments. But 
after  1980,  that  type of lag should  have  produced  unanticipated  real  wage 
gains, not the erosion  that  actually  occurred. 
The early 1980s were characterized  not only by disinflation  but by 
high  unemployment  as well. Perhaps  unemployment,  a measure  of labor 
demand conditions, accounts for the wage losses of the 1980s. But, 
again,  the evidence does not suggest  that  the early 1980s  was a period  of 
"normal"  wage determination.  Table 2 shows the actual  and predicted 
performance  of six wage indexes (three  union-oriented,  two aggregate, 
one nonunion-oriented)  during  1980-84,  with  predictions  based  on wage 
equations estimated over 1959-79. The equations contain a term for 
current  unemployment  and  lagged  price inflation;  equations  applying  to 
the union sector use a union-oriented  measure  of unemployment  rather 
than  the official  rate. Thus differences  in economic conditions  in union 
industries  as compared  with others are reflected  in the union-oriented 
unemployment  rate. Also, since the CPI  suffered  from  a methodological 
problem involving mortgage  interest rates (which boosted the index 
artificially  in the late 1970s  and early 1980s  and tended  to produce  large 
residuals),  an alternative  price index has been used in the equations.4 
4. The regressions  run  to obtain  predicted  data  for table 2 were of the form  of equa- 
tion 1 in the text, where  p is the annual  percentage  change in the deflator  for personal 
consumption  expenditures  from  the national  income  accounts  lagged  one year,  and U- I  is 
the current  year  inverse  of an unemployment  rate. For  the union  sector, a union-oriented 
unemployment  rate  was estimated  by taking  sectoral  unemployment  rates  and weighting 
them by the proportion  of union-represented  workers  in those sectors in 1984.  Sectors 
used were agriculture,  mining,  durables,  nondurables,  transportation  and  public  utilities, 
wholesale  and  retail  trade,  finance,  insurance  and  real  estate, and  services. (Since  the data 
in table  2 refer  to the private  sector, the government  sector  was not included  in the union- 
oriented  index.) Data on union  representation  in these sectors appear  in Paul  0.  Flaim, 
"New Data  on Union  Members  and  Their  Earnings,"  Employment  and  Earnings,  vol. 32 
(January  1985),  pp. 13-14, 208-11. Unemployment  rates  by sector  appear  in U.S. Bureau 
of Labor  Statistics,  Handbook  of Labor  Statistics,  bulletin  2175  (Washington,  D.C.: GPO, 
1983),  p. 75, and  in Employment  and Earnings,  various  issues. The regressions  were run 
on an annual  basis  over the period  1959-79.  The earnings  and  compensation  indexes  refer 
to year-over-year  changes; the union wage variables refer to changes within years. 
Regression  results are available  from the author. Similar  results through  mid-1983  are 
reported  in George L. Perry, "What Have We Learned about Disinflation?"  BPEA, 
2:1983,  pp. 592-94. It might  be noted  that  if the regressions  in table  2 are estimated  using 
CPI-W  for all equations  and the official  unemployment  rate for the union  wage indexes, 
similar  results  are  obtained. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  579 
Table 2.  Actual and Predicted Wage Changes,  1980-84a 
Percent 
Wage  measure  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Median  first-year  union 
wage adjustments 
Actual  9.4  11.0  3.7  3.7  2.2 
Predicted  10.7  11.8  9.8  7.1  5.4 
Median  first-year  union 
wage increases 
Actual  9.4  11.0  7.1  5.8  2.9 
Predicted  10.8  11.9  10.0  7.3  5.6 
Median  effective union 
wage adjustments 
Actual  10.7  10.5  6.7  4.7  3.7 
Predicted  10.2  11.3  9.7  7.1  5.2 
Change in hourly 
earnings  index 
Actual  9.0.  9.1  6.8  4.6  3.3 
Predicted  9.4  10.3  8.6  6.3  4.7 
Change in compensation 
per hour 
Actual  10.3  9.6  8.0  4.9  4.1 
Predicted  10.1  11.1  9.3  6.8  5.3 
Change in selected 
nonunion  hourly  earnings 
Actual  7.9  8.4  5.7  5.2  4.3 
Predicted  7.6  8.3  6.8  5.0  4.1 
Sources:  Current Wage Developments  and author's regression  as specified  in equation  1. See footnote  4. 
a.  Union  wage  indexes  refer to major private settlements  involving  1,000 or more workers.  The  hourly earnings 
index  applies  to production  and nonsupervisory  workers  in the private,  nonfarm sector  and is adjusted to exclude 
the effects  of overtime  in manufacturing and interindustry employment  shifts.  Compensation  per hour applies to all 
employees  in the nonfarm, business sector and includes private and legally required fringe benefits. Selected  nonunion 
earnings are the weighted  average  percentage  changes  in average  hourly earnings for the following  industries:  SIC 
533 (variety  stores),  SIC 56 (apparel stores),  SIC 57 (furniture stores),  and SIC 60 (banking). Weights used are the 
levels  of production and nonsupervisory  employment  in 1979. 
The three  union  and two aggregate  wage index equations  all produce 
overpredictions, particularly  starting in 1982, suggesting that actual 
wage settlements  and decisions have been lower than  would have been 
expected, given economic conditions. This finding  applies even when 
settlements  involving  wage freezes and  cuts are removed  from  the index 
of first-year  union wage agreements.  That is, even those union settle- 
ments  that  did  not  involve  wage  freezes  and  cuts  produced  surprisingly 
low wage adjustments. 
There is a difference, however, in the performance  of the union- 
oriented  indexes and  the others  with  regard  to the more  recent  residuals. 580  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table 3.  Scheduled Wage Adjustments in First, Second, and Third Years of Union 
Contracts, 1980-84  Settlements 
Percent 
Year  of  Year  in which  wage adjustment  is effective 
settle- 
ment  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
1980  9.5  8.8  6.7  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1981  ...  9.6  8.0  7.5  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1982  .  .  ...  7.0  7.0  6.1  .  .  . .. .  .. 
1983  ...  ...  ...  4.5  4.8  4.5  ...  ... 
1984  ...  ...  ...  ...  4.0  4.0  4.0  ... 
1985a  .....  ...  ...  ...  4.0  4.0  4.0 
Source:  Bureau of  National  Affairs,  Inc.,  Daily  Labor Report,  July 22,  1985, p.  B-2; January 22,  1985, p.  B-2; 
January 23,  1984, p. B-5; January 21,  1983, p. B-1; January 22,  1982, p. B-1; January 23,  1981, p.  B-2. 
a.  First six  months. 
The  compensation-per-hour  index,  which  includes  many  nonunion  work- 
ers such as managers  and supervisors, shows only a small residual  by 
1984.  The hourly-earnings  index, which exhibits  a larger  residual  in that 
year, has a much larger  union weight because it excludes supervisory 
personnel. Thus, there is a strong  possibility that the 1984  residuals  in 
the aggregate  indexes heavily  reflect  union  sector developments. 
Table 2 includes, as a test of this possibility, a nonunion hourly- 
earnings  index for selected industries  with low unionization.  The low 
unionization  rates ensure not only that there are few union workers 
covered by the index but also that spillover  and "threat" effects from 
the union  sector  are minimal.  In sharp  contrast  to the other  indexes, this 
nonunion  index is not overpredicted.  The suggestion  is that the recent 
slowing of wage growth  has been concentrated  in the union sector. As 
will be discussed  below, there  are good reasons  to expect the norm  shift 
phenomenon  to be confined  to the union  sector. 
There are also reasons to expect that the current  lull in union wage 
setting  will continue  in the future.  Table  3 shows the first-,  second-, and 
third-year  adjustments  by year of negotiation  as reported  from  a survey 
of union settlements by the private Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 
(BNA). Settlements  involving  fifty  or more  workers  are summarized  on 
a biweekly basis in the BNA Daily  Labor Report.  In the early 1980s, 
contracts  tended  to be "front  loaded," that  is, higher  adjustments  were 
scheduled  in the earlier  years of contracts,  probably  reflecting  declining 
expectations of inflation and also an expectation of more escalator Daniel J. B. Mitchell  581 
payments, or cost-of-living  adjustments,  in later years. (Escalator  ad- 
justments  are excluded  from  the table.) 
During  the most recent period shown, contract  terms have flattened 
out to an even 4 percent  per year. And, as will be demonstrated  below, 
the flatness  is unlikely  to reflect  expectations  of large  escalator  increases 
later in the contract  since escalator clauses have been limited  in union 
concession agreements.  Bargainers  appear  to expect a continuation  of 
current  moderate  wage trends. 
Concession-Prone  Sectors 
U. S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS)  data  on  union  wage  settlements, 
such as those used in table 1, cover only major  agreements  involving 
1,000  or more  workers.  A more  comprehensive  survey  is undertaken  by 
the BNA, which, as just noted, reports settlements involving fifty or 
more workers. From that survey, I culled agreements  involving first- 
year  wage  freezes or cuts for analysis. Such agreements  began  to appear 
in appreciable  numbers  in late 1981,  when they accounted  for 3 percent 
of all settlements reported. The proportion  rose to 12, 28, 27, and 22 
percent  in 1982, 1983,  1984,  and  the first  half  of 1985,  respectively. 
Data from the BNA survey reveal that concessions were not evenly 
spread  across  industries.  In  table  4, which  shows the industry  breakdown 
of wage freezes and cuts from January  1981 to June 1985, the heavy 
representation  of construction  is apparent.  Thirty-nine  percent of all 
concessions reported  were in construction,  many  in settlements  involv- 
ing relatively  small  numbers  of workers  in particular  crafts  and cities. A 
better  measure  of the concession-proneness  of various  industries  would 
be the  proportion  of all  settlements  in  the industry  involving  concessions. 
Unfortunately  this alternative  measure  could not be constructed  from 
the data at hand, though  some crude calculations  suggest that it would 
yield a picture  qualitatively  similar  to that  emerging  from  table  4.5 
5. A crude  estimate  of the proportion  of contracts  in existence in each sector shown 
on table  4 can be made  from  BNA published  data  by simply  summing  the number  of new 
settlements  reported  by sector over the three-year  period 1982-84. If all contracts  were 
exactly three years in duration,  this technique  would be completely  accurate.  But since 
the average  duration  is somewhat  less than three years, the technique  will give excess 582  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table  4. Union  Settlements  Involving  Concessions,  January  1981-June  1985a 
Percent 
industry  share  Wage  cuts as 
of all wage  percentage of all 
Industry  freezes and cuts  freezes and cuts 
Construction  39  28 
Retail  food storesb  10  34 
Metal manufacturing  9  22 
Machinery  6  11 
Lumber  and paper  4  2 
Airlines  4  40 
Meatpacking  3  60 
Printing  and publishing  3  6 
Motor  vehiclesc  3  9 
Aerospace  2  4 
All other  17  12 
Total  100  23 
Source:  Biweekly  survey  by the  Bureau of  National  Affairs,  Inc.  It covers  union  settlements  involving  fifty or 
more workers. 
a.  Table is based on  1,185 contracts.  Concessions  are first-year wage freezes  or cuts. 
b.  Includes  related wholesale  operations. 
c.  Includes  motor vehicle  parts. 
A common  interpretation  of the  concession  movement  is that  it reflects 
deregulation  in certain industries  and increased foreign competition, 
associated with the appreciation  of the dollar in the early 1980s, in 
others. Some industries  in table 4 easily fit those interpretations.  The 
airline  industry,  for example, was clearly strongly  affected by deregu- 
lation that permitted  product  market  competition  via price cutting  and 
new entry. And metals, machinery,  lumber,  and the commercial  side of 
aerospace  all suffered  from  international  competition.  But not all indus- 
tries neatly  fit the mold. 
weight  to sectors with  a propensity  for short  contracts.  A sector with  a higher  proportion 
of concessions than of contracts  is concession-prone.  Some difficulties  arise with this 
calculation  method  because the BNA uses more aggregate  industry  classifications  than 
table 4 for certain sectors. Nevertheless, using approximations  where necessary, all 
sectors  listed in table  4 except lumber  and  paper  and  printing  and  publishing  appear  to be 
concession-prone.  In particular,  construction,  which had 39 percent  of the concessions 
reported  on table  4 is estimated  to account  for  only 18  percent  of the  contracts.  Construction 
does have  a propensity  for  short  contracts  so even the 18  percent  figure  is an  overestimate. 
In the lumber  and  paper  case, most of the major  firms  have reported  concessions  in some 
units,  and  it is likely  that  the sector  would  appear  concession-prone  if the  calculation  could 
be made  based  on the percentage  of workers  rather  than  contracts. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  583 
Construction, the concession leader, was not subject to foreign 
competition. Nor, it turns out, was deregulation  a decisive influence. 
Certain  restrictions  on nonunion  bidding  for  federally  financed  construc- 
tion projects were weakened through administrative  changes in the 
Davis-Bacon Act in 1982, but because of delays due to litigation, the 
concession movement in construction was already well established 
before  the most significant  Davis-Bacon  changes  were implemented.6 
The situation is the same in retail food stores and in printing  and 
publishing.  In neither is foreign competition  or deregulation  an issue. 
The only product market  conditions that could have influenced  wage 
settlements  in construction,  supermarkets,  and printing  are the general 
economic slump  of the early 1980s  and  lower-wage,  nonunion  competi- 
tion. 
The participation  of particular  unions in concessions (not reported  in 
the table) is largely a reflection  of their representation  in concession- 
prone  industries  rather  than  of any inherent  propensity  to concede. The 
United Food and Commercial  Workers  International  Union, for exam- 
ple, had the misfortune  of representing  workers concentrated  in retail 
food stores and meatpacking,  both centers of concession bargaining.  It 
accounted for 11 percent of the wage freezes and cuts in the BNA 
sample,  more  than  any other  union. Some unions, such as the Laborers, 
Plumbers,  Operating  Engineers,  and  Plasterers,  accounted  for  significant 
numbers  of concessions solely because  of their  linkage  with  the construc- 
tion industry. Several unions represented  workers in construction  as 
well as in other high-concession  industries. The Teamsters represent 
truck drivers  in construction  and in retail  food stores. The Carpenters 
are in both construction  and lumber. The latter two unions each ac- 
counted  for 7 percent  of the freezes and  cuts in the BNA sample. 
Shifting Wage Norms 
The concept of a shift  in wage norms,  developed  by George  L. Perry, 
suggests that wage-change  expectations and targets can be viewed as 
6.  Proposals  for changing  Davis-Bacon  were originally  made  by the Reagan  adminis- 
tration  in 1982,  but  were  not  fully  in  force  until  early  1985.  Some  features  were  implemented 
in mid-1983.  See "Labor  Department  Issues Final  Rules for Setting  Davis-Bacon  Wage 
Rates," Daily  Labor  Report,  February  1, 1985,  pp. A3-A4. 584  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
shifting  discretely between periods.7  For example, Perry argues that 
wage  norms  dropped  in the early 1960s  in response  to low price  inflation, 
an extended period of relatively high unemployment,  and the federal 
wage-price  guideposts  program.  They then shifted  upward  in the 1970s 
in response to the acceleration  of inflation  in the 1960s and the price 
shocks of the mid-1970s. 
The importance  of the norm  shift  concept is that it suggests  a certain 
lethargy  in the responsiveness  of wage expectations  and targets. Thus, 
the  period  of wage  calm  that  developed  in  the early 1980s  can  be expected 
to herald  a period  of continued  calm, even in the face of moderate  real 
economic expansion. In turn, such a calm would, because of its anti- 
inflationary  effects, encourage  the  continuation  of expansionary  policies. 
Table 5 provides data suggestive of a broad  downward  shift in wage 
norms. The table shows that wage freezes and cuts began in a narrow 
range  of industries  in 1981  and have been spreading  progressively  ever 
since. As the number of industries affected grew, the conventional 
explanations-deregulation,  foreign  competition,  general  economic  dis- 
tress-became  harder to credit, and the alternative hypothesis of a 
demonstration  effect became more  difficult  to reject. 
Explanations  of the distress in the automobile  industry  in 1982, for 
example, do not carry over easily to concessions at Las Vegas hotels 
and  at Disneyland  in 1984.  The  fact  is that  management  today, in virtually 
any type of industry,  is much  more  likely to raise product  market  issues 
as part of its bargaining  tactics than it would have in the 1970s. In a 
1985 dispute involving an attempt by San Francisco gravediggers  to 
recoup from a previous one-year wage freeze, management  raised the 
specter of competitive  inroads  by nonunion  cemeteries.8  When, as was 
the case in many of the initial  concession settlements, imminent  bank- 
ruptcy  and  mass layoffs were threatened,  the resulting  wage freezes and 
cuts were easy to rationalize. But the longevity of the concession 
movement and its spread to less-than-dire  situations suggest that the 
initial  concessions have encouraged  other  employers  to try their  luck in 
demanding  similar  settlements. 
Additional  evidence of a shift in the wage-setting climate is to be 
7. George  L. Perry, "Inflation  in Theory  and Practice,"  BPEA,  1:1980, pp. 207-41. 
See also Perry,  "What  Have We Learned  about  Disinflation?"  pp. 587-602. 
8.  "Gravediggers  Expand  Strike,"  Los Angeles  Times, March  30, 1985,  part  1, p. 31. 




Industry  1981  1982  1983  1985 
Metals  X  X  X  X 
Motor vehiclesb  X  X  X  X 
Retail food  storesc  X  X  X  X 
Machinery  X  X  X  X 
Meatpacking  X  X  X  X 
Airlines  X  X  X  X 
Printing and publishing  X  X  X  X 
Health care  X  X  X  X 
Lumber and paper  X  X  X  X 
Ordnance  X  X 
Construction  X  X  X 
Transit and bus lines  X  X  X 
Rubber  X  X 
Trucking  X  X  X 
Aerospace  X  X  X 
Textiles  X  X  X 
Food  manufacturing except  meatpacking  X  X  X 
Instruments  X  X  X 
Chemicals  X  X  X 
Furniture  X  X  X 
Hotels  and restaurants  X  X  X 
Shipping  X  X  X 
Other transportation equipmentd  X  X  X 
Brick,  clay,  stone  X  X  X 
Finance,  insurance  X  X 
Communications  X  X 
Apparel  X  X 
Business  services  X  X 
Railroads  X 
Unionse  X  X 
Cement  X  X 
Entertainment  X  X 
Mining  X  X 
Warehousing  X  X 
Glass  X 
Education  X  X 
Retail except  food  stores  X 
Leather  X 
Petroleum  X 
Tobacco  X 
Utilities  X 
Source:  Same as table 4. 
a.  An  "X"  indicates  the  presence  of  at  least  one  contract  involving  a  concession  in the  industry  and  period 
indicated. Concessions  are first-year wage freezes  and cuts. 
b.  Includes motor vehicle  parts. 
c.  Includes related wholesale  operations. 
d.  Transportation equipment excluding  motor vehicles  and parts and aerospace. 
e.  Unions  in their role as employers  of their own  staffs. 586  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1985 
found in the union environment  itself. Declines in union membership, 
reduced  strike  activity,  changes  in  the  political  and  legal  balance  between 
unions and management,  shifts in management  bargaining  strategies, 
and the history of the union-nonunion  wage differential  all confirm  a 
change. 
DECLINING  UNION  REPRESENTATION  IN  THE  WORK  FORCE 
At the same time that wages were behaving  in an atypical fashion, 
union membership  began to fall rapidly  in the private sector. In May 
1980,  according  to the Current  Population Survey, unions represented 
15.5 million  wage and salary  workers  in the private  sector, a represen- 
tation  rate  of 21.7  percent.  By 1984,  the numberrepresented  had  declined 
to some 13 million, and the representation  rate, to 17 percent. This 
national  trend  was confirmed  at the local  level by BLS area  wage surveys 
of production  worker  unionization  in medium-to-large  establishments. 
Rates of unionization  fell in three-fourths  of the metropolitan  areas 
surveyed  from 1977-79  to 1980-82.9 
The economic slump  of the early 1980s  particularly  affected certain 
heavily unionized sectors of the work force, such as construction  and 
manufacturing.  But industrial  composition  cannot  account  for  the aggre- 
gate representation  losses in the union sector. According  to data from 
the BLS on workers  covered by major  contracts,  industrial  mix changes 
can explain  only about  one-quarter  of those losses.  10 
9.  See  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Earnings  and  Other  Characteristics  of 
Organized  Workers,  May 1980,  bulletin  2105  (GPO, 1981),  table  9; Flaim, "New Data  on 
Union Members."  Note that the figures  from  these sources refer  to representation,  not 
membership.  Since  some  nonmembers  are  represented  by unions,  representation  rates  are 
higher  than membership  rates. Metropolitan  area data are from U.S. Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics,  Area  Wage Surveys:  Selected  Metropolitan  Areas,  1979 and 1983, bulletins 
2050-73  and  3020-73  (GPO,  1981  and 1984). 
10. This estimate  was made using data on private  sector workers  covered by major 
agreements  in November  1979  and  October  1984  in forty-one  industry  classifications.  The 
ratio  of union  workers  covered by major  agreements  in each industry  to production  and 
nonsupervisory  worker  employment  was calculated  for November 1979.  This ratio  was 
then applied  to the October  1984  employment  figures  to estimate  a predicted  number  of 
union  workers.  The number  of union  workers  fell from  9.4 million  in 1979  to 7.4 million  in 
1984,  a drop  of 2 million,  compared  with  the  500,000  drop  predicted  by the  ratio  projections. 
Thus, only one-fourth  of the drop  is explained  by employment  changes.  Data  on workers 
under  major  union  agreements  appear  in Monthly  Labor  Review,  vol. 103  (January  1980), 
p. 10,  and  vol. 108  (January  1985),  p. 24. Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  587 
Unions simply lost more in the 1980s,  in terms of both membership 
and  wage settlements,  than  can  be explained  by economic  circumstances 
and historical  relationships.  To the extent that  unions  lose membership 
only because of interindustry  employment shifts, they need not lose 
bargaining  power,  though  they might  lose some  political  clout. But  losses 
within industries do suggest weakened bargaining  positions due to 
greater  competition  with nonunion  firms  in the product  market. 
DECREASED  STRIKE  ACTIVITY 
Strike  incidence  has  always  posed  an analytical  puzzle  to economists. 
In theory, strikes are random "mistakes" made by the parties about 
each other's true  bargaining  position. But in fact, strikes  seem to reflect 
shifts in union militancy. Periods of upward  adjustment  in the wage 
norm, such as the late 1960s, have been accompanied  by heavy strike 
activity. In contrast, in the early 1960s,  when the wage norm  was low, 
strike  activity  was quiescent. 
Table  6 suggests  a resemblance  between the early 1980s  and  the early 
1960s in this regard. Whether  measured  by BLS indexes of reported 
strikes  involving  1,000  or more  workers  or  by Current  Population  Survey 
reports  of individuals  with ajob but  absent  from  work  because  of a labor 
dispute, the level of strike activity accompanying  the low wage settle- 
ments in the early 1980s  fell sharply.  Regression  analysis  also indicates 
an abnormally  low incidence  of strikes  during  the concession period.  II 
There  were some bitter  disputes  in the 1980s.  However, in a number 
of prominent  conflicts,  such as Continental  Airlines  Corporation,  Phelps 
Dodge Corporation,  and  Louisiana-Pacific  Corporation,  employers  suc- 
ceeded in operating with nonunion personnel, perhaps discouraging 
other workers  from striking  in an era of job insecurity. As long as this 
atmosphere  of insecurity  persists, as it is likely to do unless unemploy- 
11. I ran  annual  regressions  over  the period  1959-79  to explain  the  three  strike  indexes 
reported  in table 6. The independent  variables  were the official  unemployment  rate and 
price inflation  (CPI-W)  lagged  one year. Predicted  values for 1980-84 exceeded actual 
values for all years for the number  of larger  strikes  and for all years except 1983  for the 
indexes of worker  involvement.  A telephone  industry  strike  in 1983  pushed up worker 
involvement  substantially;  had I included  a variable  for number  of workers  negotiating, 
this one deviant  result would probably  have vanished. Regression  results are available 
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Table 6.  Work Stoppages, 1960-84 
Average annual 
number  of workers 
Average  annual  involved  in  Average monthly 
number  of stoppages  stoppages  number  of employees 
beginning  in period  beginning  in  not at work  because 
Period  indicateda  period indicateda  of labor disputesb 
1960-64  211.0  883,000  44,200 
1965-69  354.8  1,584,400  88,200 
1970-74  334.0  1,831,000  120,600 
1975-79  243.6  1,144,600  110,800 
1980-84  114.2  693,000  67,200 
Sources:  U.S.  Bureau of  Labor  Statistics,  "Major Work Stoppages:  1984,"  News,  press  release  USDL:  85-85, 
February  27,  1985; U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Handbook  of  Labor  Statistics,  bulletin  2175  (GPO,  1983), 
p. 61; Employment and Earnings,  various issues. 
a.  Situations involving  1,000 or more workers. 
b.  Figures in this column are simple means of the annual averages. 
ment rates  fall markedly  in the union sector, lower wage-change  norms 
can be expected to continue. 
THE  POLITICAL-LEGAL  SETTING 
Since the advent  of the Reagan  administration,  unions  have not found 
encouragement  in the processes of labor  market  regulation.  While  there 
have been no changes  in basic labor  legislation,  administrative  appoint- 
ments and changes at agencies such as the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) are perceived by unions as hostile to their interests. 
Although  legal scholars  can debate  the wisdom  of this or that NLRB or 
court decision, there is little doubt that the changes in the regulatory 
climate  have complicated  union  efforts  to win substantial  pay advances, 
preserve  jobs, and engage  in new organizing.  12 Regulatory  changes  that 
hamper  job preservation  and organizing,  in particular,  open the door to 
more nonunion competition and resultant management  resistance to 
union  wage demands. 
Even  before  the  concession  era,  attitudes  toward  collective  bargaining 
were changing.  Industrial  relations  researchers  are  now finding  evidence 
that in the late 1960s, a heightened  determination  to resist new union- 
12. This is certainly  perceived to be the case by leaders of organized  labor. See 
"'Drastic  Change'  in Legal  Climate  Drives  Unions  Away  from  NLRB Protection,"  Daily 
Labor Report, February  13, 1985, pp. C1-C7. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  589 
ization developed in the management  community.13  This change in 
management  attitudes  may well have been linked  to the upward  shift in 
wage-change  norms,  with  its accompanying  strikes,  militancy,  and  rank- 
and-file  rejections  of tentative  settlements  reached  by union  leaders. In 
any case, experimentation  by employers  revealed  that the legal system 
could accommodate  increased management  resistance to new union- 
ization  without  substantial  penalties. 
The 1984  presidential  campaign  was seen by organized  labor  as crucial 
to its future. While the AFL-CIO  attempted  to put a bright  face on the 
Mondale  electoral debacle by noting that a majority  of their members 
supported  the Democratic ticket, the large membership  losses noted 
above  raise  important  questions  about  the  future  political  clout  of unions. 
In the aftermath  of Mondale's defeat, the AFL-CIO even began to 
reconsider  whether  collective bargaining  should  remain  the centerpiece 
of its activities.14 There is no way of quantifying  the impact of these 
developments  on collective bargaining  outcomes, but the overall effect 
will be to prolong  the period  of lowered  wage expectations. 
MANAGEMENT  BARGAINING  STRATEGIES 
Management,  cheered by what is perceived as a shift in the balance 
of power, has changed  its bargaining  goals. Managers  in the 1980s  are 
more  concerned  with  the economic  fortunes  of their  enterprises  and  less 
concerned  with  industry  wage  patterns  than  they were in  the 1970s.  They 
are also more  willing  to demand  givebacks  from  unions  and less willing 
to make  accommodating  trade-offs.  15 
13. For  example,  an (upward)  inflection  point  can be observed  around  1970  in various 
indexes related  to unfair  labor practices  of employers  handled  by the National Labor 
Relations  Board.  See Richard  B. Freeman  and James  L. Medoff, What  Do Unions  Do? 
(Basic  Books, 1984),  pp. 230-33. A major  study  has been under  way at the Massachusetts 
Institute  of Technology  concerning  changes  in the industrial  relations  system.  The M.I.T. 
researchers  conclude  that  large,  nonunion  firms  became  the leaders  in industrial  relations 
innovations  "somewhere  in the 1960s"  as their  motivation  to remain  nonunion  increased. 
See Thomas A. Kochan, Robert B. McKersie, and Harry  C. Katz, "U.S.  Industrial 
Relations  in Transition:  A Summary  Report,"  in Barbara  D. Dennis,  ed., Proceedings  of 
the Thirty-seventhAnnual  Meeting,  December  28-30, 1984,  Industrial  Relations  Research 
Association  (Madison:  IRRA, 1985),  pp. 261-76. 
14. "Report  of the AFL-CIO  Committee  on the Evolution  of Work  on the Changing 
Situation  of Workers  and  Their  Unions,  " Daily  Labor  Report,  February  25, 1985,  pp. D1  - 
D22. 
15.  Audrey Freedman, The New Look in Wage Policy andEmployee  Relations,  Report 590  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
The political  and legal climate  change  has been reflected  in a greater 
willingness  by management  to take actions in labor  disputes  that might 
not have been publicly or politically  acceptable  in the past. Operating 
with nonunion  labor-or  threatening  to do so-seems  more common 
than was once the case. Even firms  with a long history  of unionization 
are  using  nonunion  labor.  16 During  the early 1960s,  there  was discussion 
of a management  "hardening"  that coincided with a downward  wage 
norm  shift;  the same symptoms  are evident today. 
THE  UNION-NONUNION  WAGE  DIFFERENTIAL 
The widening  of the union-nonunion  wage differential  in the 1970s  is 
by now a familiar  story. Unfortunately,  the BLS did not start  explicitly 
measuring  union and nonunion  wage trends  until the mid-1970s.  Thus, 
estimates of the level of the differential, or the degree to which it 
widened,  will vary  depending  on data  sources. 
From 1975,  when data for the index began to be collected, to 1982, 
the BLS Employment  Cost Index for wages and salaries indicated a 
widening  of the  union-nonunion  differential  of about  8 percentage  points. 
By early 1985, some 3 points had been subtracted  from the 1982  peak. 
That  the differential  remains  wider  today  than  in the mid-  1970s  suggests, 
in concert  with  other  labor  market  developments  noted  above, a contin- 
ued moderate  union  wage norm. 
Apart from its utility as a forecasting device, the union-nonunion 
wage differential  provides  insights  into the institutional  underpinning  of 
the concept of a wage norm shift. For management  facing unionized 
labor, the costs of experimentation  in wage settlements  are potentially 
high, because of the strike threat  and the bargaining  relationship.  The 
union-nonunion  wage  differential  may  grow  simply  because  management 
is reluctant  to test its ability  to stop it. Labor  costs become too high in 
865  (New York:  Conference  Board, 1985),  chapters  2 and  3. See also Employer  Attitudes 
toward Compensation Change and Corporate Values (William M. Mercer, Inc., September 
1983),  p. 13, which  reports  that  two-thirds  of the managers  surveyed  believe that  across- 
the-board  pay  increases  will be less important  than  they have been in the past. 
16. For example, Armour  Food Co., a well-established  firm  with a long history of 
unionization,  was recently reported  to have closed facilities and replaced  2,000 union 
workers  with  nonunion  personnel  upon  reopening.  See Henry  Weinstein,  "Armour  Food 
Draws  Fire  as NLRB Probes  Charges  of Hiring  Bias," Los Angeles Times,  February  19, 
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the long run because short-run  calculations of costs and benefits by 
management  suggest  the  wisdom  of a passive  response  to union  demands. 
Finally, however, a recession pushes managers  in certain  industries  to 
experiment,  and other managers,  emboldened,  follow the example. In 
fact, the downward  wage norm  shift in the 1960s  was also preceded  by 
a widening  union-nonunion  wage differential  in the 1950s.  History thus 
has repeated  itself in the 1980s. 
Categorizing  the Concessions 
Three  years  ago, I suggested  that  concessions, and  their  effects, could 
be categorized  according  to the coefficients of a stylized wage-change 
equation  of the form: 
(1)  w =  a +  bU-1  +  cp, 
where U-1 is the inverse of the unemployment  rate (or some other 
demand-sensitive  variable),  p is some measure  of lagged  price inflation, 
w is the annual rate of wage change, and a,  b, and c are regression 
coefficients.17 The a coefficient can be viewed as a measure of wage 
pressure. Given a rate of price inflation  and a real measure of labor 
demand,  a large  value  of a would suggest  higher  wage increases;  a lower 
value would  suggest  wage moderation.  Similarly,  the higher  the value of 
b, the greater is wage sensitivity to real demand conditions; and the 
higher  the value of c, the greater  is wage sensitivity to price inflation. 
Concessions can be analyzed in terms of their effects on these three 
coefficients. 
CHANGES  IN  WAGE  PRESSURE 
Perry's  concept of changing  wage "norms"  can be discussed  in terms 
of a shift in the a coefficient. In 1983,  union  wage concessions began  to 
include two features that suggest a drop in wage pressure: first, the 
substitution  of a fixed bonus for a guaranteed  wage rate increase and 
second, pay cuts for entry-level  employees. Both  changes  can  be viewed 
17. Mitchell,  "Recent Union  Contract  Concessions," pp. 189-92. See also Robert  J. 
Flanagan,  "Wage  Concessions  and Long-Term  Union  Wage  Flexibility,"  BPEA, 1:1984, 
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as mechanisms by which a downward shift in wage norms can be 
accommodated. 
Fixed bonuses have been particularly  prominent  in concessions in 
three  industries.  Lumber  and  paper  workers  have 28 percent  of all fixed 
bonus plans included in settlements from January 1983  through  June 
1985;  aerospace  workers  have 16  percent;  and  retail  food store  workers, 
19 percent. Fixed bonus plans were found in about 30 percent of the 
wage freeze and cut settlements  reported  during  the first six months  of 
1985,  up from  8 percent  in 1984,  before  which they were negligible.  The 
BNA also estimates  that such plans were included  in some 7 percent  of 
all 1984  agreements,  concession and nonconcession; among the latter 
were the well-publicized  General  Motors Corporation  and Ford Motor 
Company  agreements. 
The use of fixed bonus plans has an important  wage-change  effect, 
especially in multiyear  contracts. A three-year  contract  containing  a 3 
percent wage increase each year produces an annual wage 9 percent 
above the initial base in the third year. In contrast, a bonus plan in- 
volving 3 percent  lump sum distributions  does not raise the basic wage 
at all and  produces  a compensation  level only 3 percent  above the initial 
base in the third year. Indeed, since such plans often do not pay the 
bonus to workers employed less than a full year before the payment 
date, the compensation  increase averaged over the entire work force 
may well be less than  3 percent.18 
The second contractual  feature that reduces labor cost increases is 
cuts in pay for entry-level  employees. These arrangements,  commonly 
called "two-tier  wage  plans"  because  of the dual  pay or  benefit  structure 
created, are more likely than across-the-board  pay cuts to win the 
approval  of existing  employees in union  ratification  votes. The plans  are 
of two basic types. Permanent  plans create an entirely separate pay 
structure  for new hires, who never catch up with existing workers. 
Temporary  plans provide for a catch-up  period, though  in some cases 
the catch-up  period is so long-sometimes  as much as ten years-that 
the plan  is quasi-permanent.  19 
18. The BLS currently  is in a dispute  with the aerospace  industry  over the treatment 
of bonuses  in  calculating  average  hourly  earnings.  The  BLS wishes  to exclude  the  bonuses, 
while the industry,  which has sales contracts  indexed  to average  hourly  earnings  in SIC 
3721,  wants  to include  them. As a result,  earnings  data  for that  industry  are currently  not 
being  published. 
19. For example, the Packard Electric Division of General Motors Corporation Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  593 
Just  under  half  of a sample  of two-tier  contracts  collected by the BNA 
in mid-1984  were of the permanent  variety.20  A survey of Los Angeles 
area  firms  that I conducted  with Sanford  M. Jacoby  found that of those 
firms  reporting  two-tier  plans,  just over half had temporary  plans only, 
almost 30 percent had permanent  plans only, and the others had both 
types.21 Although there have been some instances in which unions 
negotiated  the abolition  of a two-tier  plan, adoption  of the plans is still 
increasing. The BNA reported that 8 percent of all nonconstruction 
settlements  had some type of two-tier  system in 1984,  up  from  5 percent 
in 1983.22 
Within  the concession sector, the two-tier  movement  began  to appear 
in 1982; in 1984, 10 percent of concession contracts had provisions 
reducing  entry wage rates; in the first six months  of 1985, 12  percent  of 
concession contracts  had such provisions.  Two-tier  arrangements  were 
particularly  concentrated  in the supermarket  industry, which had 34 
percent  of all such plans included  in settlements  between January  1982 
and June 1985.  Aerospace and construction  each had 11  percent. Two- 
tier plans  also figured  in several  prominent  airline  settlements  that  were 
not  concessions as defined  here.  In  construction,  where  the  casual  nature 
of the employer-employee  relationship  does not lend itself to permanent 
plans, two-tier plans were mainly  cuts in apprentice  wages relative to 
those ofjourneymen.  Those in aerospace  may  have resulted  in part  from 
Defense Department  pressure  on contractors  to hold down labor  costs, 
pressure  strongly  protested  by the unions  affected. 
Two-tier  plans have interesting  implications  for industrial  relations, 
since, at least under the permanent  systems, they involve employees 
working  side by side under  separate  pay schedules. In cases where skill 
differentials  were narrowed  by escalators in the 1970s, two-tier plans 
established  a ten-year  two-tier  plan in late 1984. Under the plan, new hires start at 55 
percent  of the existing worker  wage. See "GM Workers  at Packard  Site Approve  New 
Labor  Accord," Wall  Street  Journal,  December  17, 1984,  p. 18. 
20. The BNA provided  the author  with a printout  of the cases surveyed.  The survey 
was reported  in "Two-Tier Wage Contracts  Advancing  in Popularity,"  Daily Labor 
Report,  July 11, 1984,  pp. B4-B6. 
21. Note that the BNA survey was based  on number  of contracts,  while the Jacoby- 
Mitchell survey was based on the firm as a unit of observation. Firms were asked if 
any  of their  wage  contracts  had  two-tier  arrangements.  See Sanford  M. Jacoby  and  Daniel 
J. B. Mitchell, "Management  Attitudes toward Two-Tier Pay Plans: An Analysis," 
Journal of Labor Research,  forthcoming. 
22. "Two-Tier  Wage  Systems  Found  More  Commonly  in Nonmanufacturing  Sector," 
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may  be a way of restoring  a wide wage spread.  However, the implication 
of two-tier  plans  for  future  pay adjustments  is simple  arithmetic.  As long 
as the proportion  of employment  in the lower tier is expanding,  actual 
pay adjustments  will be lower than  those reported  for the upper  tier. 
CHANGES  IN  RESPONSIVENESS  TO  DEMAND 
While the concession settlements can be viewed as responsive to 
demand  conditions,  this does not imply  that  a greater  responsiveness  to 
demand-a  larger  b coefficient-can  be expected in the future. Exam- 
ining other characteristics  of recent bargains  sheds some light on this 
question.  One  explanation  for past insensitivity  of union  wages to short- 
run  demand  fluctuations  has  been the multiyear  contract.  Such  contracts 
normally prevent wages from reacting to changes in demand after 
negotiations  are concluded. They might also give rise to a multiyear 
wage-setting horizon that encourages bargainers  to ignore economic 
conditions  at the time of negotiations  as "transitory." 
In general, however, the concession contracts have maintained  the 
multiyear  framework,  as can be seen in table 7. Contract  durations  for 
the concession agreements  are slightly  below the all-settlement  average, 
but tend to be in the two-and-one-half-year  range. Contracts  with cost- 
of-living  adjustment  (COLA)  clauses tend to be three-year  agreements. 
Those with no COLA  average  a little over two years in length. Much  of 
the shortening  that has occurred is concentrated  in construction, an 
industry that has shown a decided propensity to  shift to  one-year 
contracts  during  previous  episodes of wage uncertainty.23 
Profit  sharing,  which has been part  of some concession agreements, 
adds an element of wage responsiveness to the business cycle, since 
profits  are likely to reflect  cyclical conditions. But profit  sharing  in the 
union  sector  does not appear  to be spreading  rapidly.  In 1981,  10  percent 
of all concession contracts  included  profit-sharing  plans. In 1984,  only 3 
percent did so; in the first six months of 1985,  4 percent. Measured  by 
workers  covered, rather  than number  of contracts, over 80 percent of 
the union workers  covered by concession agreements  with new profit- 
sharing  plans are at General  Motors and Ford; the overall number  of 
workers  covered is probably  in the 500,000  to 600,000  range. 
23. Arnold  R. Weber  and Daniel J. B. Mitchell, TThe  Pay  Board's  Progress:  Wage 
Controls in Phase II (Brookings,  1978),  pp. 363-67. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  595 
Table 7.  Contract Duration in Settlements with Concessions and in All Settlements, 
January 1981-June  1985 
Months 
Concession  contracts 
With  Without  All  All 
Period  COLA  COLA  contracts  settlementsa 
1981  32  18  24  32 
1982  34  26  30  29 
1983  35  27  29  32 
1984  34  27  29  31 
1985'  34  31  32  32 
January 1981-June  1985  34  28  29  31 
Sources:  Same as table 4 and Daily Labor Report,  section  B, issues  of January 22, 1982; January 21, 1983; January 
23,  1984; January 22,  1985; July 22,  1985. 
a.  Calculated from information appearing in Daily Labor Report on one-year,  two-year,  and three-year contracts. 
It was  assumed  that these  contracts  had durations of  12, 24, and 36 months,  respectively,  and that other contracts 
had durations  of 48 months.  Results  for  1981-85  are weighted  by  number of  settlements  in each  pefiod's  survey. 
Excludes  contracts  of unknown duration. Concessions  are first-year wage freezes  and cuts. 
b.  First six months. 
One reason  that  profit  sharing  is not more  widespread  is that  conces- 
sion bargainers  often adopt employee stock ownership  plans (ESOPs) 
instead, primarily  because ESOPs are the beneficiary  of a variety of 
strong  tax incentives. Thus, from 1983  to 1984,  the number  of workers, 
both union and nonunion,  covered by ESOPs rose by 19 percent, and 
the number  of ESOPs  rose by over 6 percent.24  Except for the very rare 
case of 100  percent  employee  ownership,  however, ESOPs  do not affect 
labor costs; they simply spread the equity interest in the firm over a 
wider  range  of owners, some of whom happen  to be employees. 
WAGE SENSITIVITY TO PRICE CHANGE 
The best clue concerning  wage sensitivity to price inflation  is to be 
found  in  the treatment  of COLA  clauses. According  to BLS data,  COLAs 
covered about 59 percent of workers  under  major  private  contracts in 
late 1979  and  57  percent  in late 1984.  When 1979  is used as a base period, 
it appears that changes in industry mix account for almost all of the 
24. See "Employee  Ownership  Plans  Jumped  to 6,800  in 1984,"  Daily  Labor Report, 
April  3, 1985,  p. AS. Although  union-nonunion  breakdowns  of the plans  are  not available, 
there is evidence of growing  union interest in ESOPs. See "Acceptance  of Employee 
Stock  Ownership  Plans  Growing  within  Ranks  of Organized  Labor,"  Daily  Labor  Report, 
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change;  the number  of workers  covered by COLAs  in 1984  was over 95 
percent  of the level that  would  have been predicted  using 1979  industry- 
level COLA  propensities.  On  a contract  basis, the actual  level was about 
86 percent  of that  predicted.25 
Management  felt "burned"  by COLAs in the late 1970s,  because of 
unanticipated  inflation  and  certain  aberrations  in the CPI. However, the 
standard  reaction  in the 1980s  was not to abandon  the COLA  principle, 
with the notable exception of a recent Teamsters intercity trucking 
settlement.  Indeed, given the reduction  in price inflation,  which histori- 
cally has been associated with elimination  of COLA  clauses, collective 
bargainers  appear  to have stuck  to their  COLAs  with  surprising  tenacity. 
Major  contract  data suggest, however, that the "quality"  of COLAs 
has deteriorated. During 1980-82, COLAs provided 60-70 percent 
protection  against  inflation;  that  is, a 1  percent  increase  in  prices  triggered 
a 0.6-0.7 percent  wage increase. In 1983-84,  the ratio  was estimated  at 
a little over 50 percent.26 
The  concession contract  data  support  these findings.  Table  8 provides 
a breakdown  of "COLA contracts," concession contracts that either 
preserved  or eliminated  a COLA. About 28 percent  of the contracts  fell 
into  this  category,  despite  the  large  proportion  of settlements  in  construc- 
tion, where COLAs are rare. Of the COLA contracts, only 7 percent 
involved a COLA elimination.  Eight percent retained  reference to the 
COLA principle  but suspended  the operation  of the COLA clause for 
the life of the agreement.  Fifty-one percent retained  an active COLA 
clause but limited  its operation  in some way. The remainder  provided 
for open-ended  COLA  operation  with no limitations. 
COLAs can be limited in a number  of ways: by diverting COLA 
money to fringe benefits; placing a cap on payouts regardless  of the 
inflation  rate;  freezing  operation  of the COLA  below a minimum  rate  of 
inflation;  eliminating  certain  payments;  reducing  the frequency  of pay- 
ments, for example, from quarterly  to annual;  and delaying  payments. 
With the exception of the last two devices, the COLA limitations  will 
25. Using  the same  data  source  on private  sector  workers  under  major  contracts  cited 
in  footnote  10,  I calculated  the ratio  of workers  with  COLAs  to the  total  number  of workers 
under major  agreements  in each industry  as of November 1979. Actual and predicted 
numbers  of workers with COLAs were then calculated  for October 1984. The same 
tabulation  was made  for number  of agreements. 
26. These  estimates  were reported  in Clurrent  Wage Dei'elopments,  various  issues. Daniel  J.  B.  Mitchell  597 
Table 8.  Trends in COLA Clauses in Concession Contracts, January 1981-June  1985a 
COLA 
COLA contracts  Suspended  elimination  Limited COLA 
as percentage  of  COLA contracts  contracts  as  contracts  as 
all concession  as percentage  of  percentage  of  percentage  of 
Sector  contracts  COLA contracts  COLA contracts  COLA contracts 
Construction  7  0  0  45 
Other  42  9  8  51 
Total  28  8  7  51 
Source:  Same as table 4. 
a.  COLA  contracts  are  contracts  with  active  or  suspended  COLA  clauses  plus  contracts  eliminating  COLA 
clauses.  Concessions  are first-year wage freezes  and cuts. 
produce lower wage costs over the course of a contract. In fact, most of 
the COLA limitations imposed do reduce the wage adjustment over the 
life of the contract.27 
Both the heavy use of COLA limitations in the concession  agreements 
and the BLS data on the lessened degree of real wage protection provided 
by recent COLA clauses  suggest a reduction in the c coefficient  in the 
wage-change  equation.  As with the other concession  features,  there is 
no sure way of predicting the staying power of the innovations. However, 
the fact that the COLA principle was  retained is significant. It is one 
thing to realign the real or relative wage level through COLA manipula- 
tions, another to pretend indefinitely that price inflation does not erode 
purchasing power. COLA clauses in themselves  have typically provided 
less than 100  percent protection against inflation; yet contracts containing 
COLAs,  including their guaranteed wage  increases,  have  historically 
provided roughly full protection.28 Still, in the near term, COLA restric- 
tions will mean that union wages will be less  sensitive  to price inflation 
than they were in the 1970s. 
Implications  for Aggregate  Wage Change 
Despite  its notable shrinkage, the union sector still has a dispropor- 
tionate  weight  in aggregate  wage  indexes,  especially  average  hourly 
earnings.  Union  workers  earn  significant  premiums  compared  with 
27. I went  back  to the  original  contract  listings  for  the  COLA  settlements  and  examined 
their  reported  details.  The statement  in the text is based  on this  examination. 
28. See Mitchell,  Uniions, Wages, and Inflation, pp. 137-49. 598  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
nonunion  workers and also work longer hours per week. Thus, their 
weight  in total  payrolls  exceeds their  weight  in total  employment.  Union 
wages have a weight of roughly  one-third,  for example, in the Employ- 
ment  Cost Index. Wayne  Vroman  estimates  that  union  wages accounted 
for 48 percent of production  worker  pay as of 1980, thus giving them 
substantial  weight  in the average  hourly  earnings  series. Their  weight  in 
average  hourly  earnings  in manufacturing  may be on the order  of three- 
fourths.29  As a result,  union-sector  wage  developments  remain  important 
to aggregate  wage changes. 
Nonunion  wages do not mechanically  follow union  wages;  if they did, 
the union-nonunion  wage differential  could not have widened  as it did  in 
the 1970s. The reversal of the widening  trend after 1982  also suggests 
that the slowing of union wage growth is not being fully reflected in 
wages of nonunion  employees. Of course, many nonunion  employees 
do not work in close proximity to union workers and so might be 
relatively  insulated  from  wage spillover  effects. As a partial  test of direct 
union-to-nonunion  spillover in the early 1980s, I used BLS area wage 
surveys to select metropolitan  areas where unionization  of production 
workers  was at  least 70  percent  in  manufacturing,  but  where  unionization 
of clerical workers in the same establishments  was below 10 percent. 
Ten areas met these criteria.  Table  9 compares  the wage movements  of 
heavily  unionized  production  workers  with  those of the  lightly  unionized 
clerical workers. As can be seen, wages of clerical workers in the 
selected areas  rose more  slowly than  those of blue-collar  workers  in the 
late 1970s, then more quickly from 1982 to 1984. Thus, the data for 
nonunion  clerical workers in close proximity  to unionized  production 
workers  exhibit the same tendencies found in general  comparisons  of 
nonunion  and  union  wages. Nonunion  workers  were less affected  by the 
downward  norm  shift  of the 1980s  than  were union  workers. 
Of course, some spillovers  to the nonunion  sector  did  occur;  it is easy 
to cite particular  cases in which executive and nonunion  white-collar 
pay was limited  as a quid pro quo or as an inducement  for union wage 
29. Estimates  for the employment  cost index  were  provided  to the author  by the BLS. 
On  production  worker  wages, see Wayne  Vroman,  "Cost-of-Living  Escalators  and  Price- 
Wage  Linkages  in  the  U.S. Economy,  1968-1980,  "  Industrial andLaborRelations  Review, 
vol. 38 (January  1985),  p. 227. The estimate  for hourly  earnings  in manufacturing  is based 
on the blue-collar  component  of the employment  cost index, since union  weights  are not 
calculated  for hourly  earnings. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  599 
Table  9. Wage  Trends  in Selected  Metropolitan  Areas, 1975-84a 
Percent  change  per year 
Category  of employee  1975-79  1979-82  1982-84 
Unskilled  plant  worker  8.6  10.2  5.4 
Skilled  plant  worker  8.6  9.4  5.3 
Office  clerical  worker  7.7  9.9  5.9 
Source:  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Area  Wage Surveys for selected  areas. 
a.  See  text  for selection  criteria for areas.  Figures  are simple averages  of annualized  wage  rate changes  for ten 
areas. 
concessions.30  However, even if such union-to-nonunion  spillovers  are 
limited in importance, the union sector is  still large enough for a 
downward  shift in its wage norms  to affect aggregate  wage indexes. If 
the peak of concessionary settlements  has now passed, there could be 
some "firming"  of reported  pay adjustments  as the proportion  of freezes 
and cuts diminishes. But even those settlements containing  positive 
wage adjustments  have been notably  moderate  in recent  years. There  is 
nothing in the labor market that would suggest a reversal of  this 
moderation. 
30. For example, International  Harvester announced management  pay cuts just 
before  requesting  union  wage concessions in early 1982.  See William  C. Rempel, "Har- 
vester  Asks UAW  for Relief," Los Angeles Times,  February  19, 1982,  part  IV, p. 2. Comments 
and Discussion 
Katharine  G. Abraham: Daniel Mitchell's  paper  contains  a great  deal 
of interesting  material  on recent developments  in collective bargaining. 
Rather  than  walk  through  all of the useful  detailed  evidence Mitchell  has 
amassed,  I have  organized  my remarks  around  the two issues that  appear 
to be central  to the paper. The first is how best to interpret  the recent 
slowdown  in the growth  of union  wages. Mitchell  estimates  a relatively 
sparse model that overpredicts  union wage growth over the past few 
years, then discusses economic and noneconomic factors that could 
have contributed  to this shortfall of actual union wage growth. An 
alternative,  and in my view preferable,  approach  would have been to 
estimate a richer wage growth model that explicitly incorporates  the 
noncyclical  economic  factors  Mitchell  believes have affected  the growth 
of union  wages. I suspect that such a model would not leave a negative 
union  wage growth  residual  to be explained  in noneconomic  terms. The 
second issue is the path we should  expect union wages to follow in the 
near future. I am less convinced than Mitchell that the mechanisms 
imbedded  in current  union  contracts  will work  to moderate  wage growth 
significantly,  though my reading  of the underlying  pressures on union 
wages  leads me to concur  that  we can expect union  wages  to grow  slowly 
for at least the next few years. 
The  main  evidence  for  the  argument  that  the  union  wage  determination 
process has changed  appears  in table 2 of the paper. Median  first-year 
union wage adjustments  and median  effective union wage adjustments 
were lower in 1983  and 1984  than predicted  on the basis of their past 
relationships  with a union-oriented  unemployment  rate  and  inflation.  In 
contrast,  hourly  earnings  adjustments  in a selected subset of nonunion 
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industries  recovered to the level predicted on the basis of their past 
relationship  with  the overall  unemployment  rate  and  inflation. 
Whether  the below-predicted  rate  of growth  in union  wages has what 
I would  consider  structural  significance  depends  upon  whether  the union 
wage growth prediction equation adequately captures the economic 
forces that drive wages. I am particularly  concerned that the union- 
oriented  unemployment  rate, an appealing  cyclical variable,  may not be 
a good indicator  of longer  term  influences  on the strength  of demand  for 
union  labor. 
It is well known  that  many  of the heavily  unionized  industries  suffered 
dramatic  declines in employment  during  the early 1980s.  My own table 
1 reports, for thirteen  broad  industry  aggregates,  the share of workers 
unionized in 1979  and the employment  growth rate from 1979  to 1983 
and from 1979  to 1984.  Across these broad  industry  groups, the corre- 
lation  between the share  unionized  and  the net employment  growth  rate 
is  -.597.  Many of the heavily unionized industries  suffered  large net 
employment  losses from 1979  to 1983, while all of the industries  with 
unionization  rates  below 25 percent  experienced  net employment  growth. 
This difference  in the experience  of unionized  and nonunionized  indus- 
tries does not appear  to reflect  only differences  in their  cyclical sensitiv- 
ities. The recovery was well established by  1984; nonetheless, the 
correlation  between  the share  unionized  and  the net employment  growth 
rate from 1979 to 1984 is  -.669,  and many of the heavily unionized 
industries  had  not regained  their 1979  employment  levels by 1984.  While 
it would be difficult  to completely  disentangle  the longer  term employ- 
ment  effects of deregulation,  foreign  competition,  technological  change, 
and other factors from the shorter term employment effects of the 
prolonged  cyclical downturn  of the early 1980s,  it seems clear that the 
recession does not fully account  for the weak employment  performance 
of the heavily unionized  industries  in recent years. The union-oriented 
unemployment  rate that underlies the wage predictions  in Mitchell's 
table  2 captures  cyclical changes  in labor  market  conditions  in unionized 
industries,  but not the continuing  problems  suggested by the employ- 
ment  statistics.  The union-oriented  unemployment  rate  is roughly  equal 
to the overall  unemployment  rate  in 1979;  rises above it during  the 1980 
to 1983  period, reflecting  the greater  cyclical sensitivity of the heavily 
unionized industries; and then falls back to rough equality with the 602  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table 1.  Unionization and Employment Growth Rates across Industries 
Percent 
Employment  Employment 
Unionization  growth rate,  growth rate, 
Industry  rate,  1979  1979-83  1979-84 
Mining  34.9  6.7  4.3 
Construction  34.0  -  15.0  -7.1 
Durable  manufacturing  38.6  -  13.9  - 8.3 
Nondurable  manufacturing  32.0  - 6.5  -4.0 
Transportation  52.2  -  10.0  -4.7 
Communication  and utilities  50.4  4.3  7.5 
Wholesale  trade  13.4  1.2  6.9 
Retail  trade  10.3  2.1  8.7 
Finance, insurance,  and real 
estate  5.7  9.9  14.1 
Business and repair  services  9.5  21.1  35.4 
Personal  services  7.1  6.5  16.4 
Entertainment  and 
recreation  services  15.8  11.8  12.7 
Professional  and related 
services  22.4  14.6  17.8 
Sources:  Unionization  figures  are  three-year  moving  average  union  membership  estimates  based  on  the  May 
Current Popiulation Survey, as reported in Edward C. Kokkelenberg  and Donna R. Sockell,  "Union  Membership in 
the  United  States,  1973-1981,"  Industrial  and Labor Relations  Review,  vol.  38 (July  1985), p.  533.  Employment 
growth  rate figures are based  on nonagricultural payroll employment  data from various  issues  of E,nploymenit anid 
Eartzings. 
overall  rate  by 1984.'  I thus do not find  it surprising  that  post-1983  union 
wage adjustments  are lower than predicted  on the basis of their past 
association  with the union-oriented  unemployment  rate. 
In addition to not fully capturing  the significant  differences in the 
labor  demand  conditions  in more  and  less heavily unionized  industries, 
the union  wage  growth  predictions  in table  2 ignore  the  fact  that  domestic 
nonunion  competition,  both realized  and  potential,  has become a salient 
consideration  for many unionized enterprises. Mitchell is obviously 
cognizant  of the importance  of nonunion  competition.  Later  in  the paper, 
he presents evidence both that the union-nonunion  wage differential 
grew substantially  during  the 1970s and that union representation  de- 
clined  more  between 1979  and 1984  than  could  be accounted  for by shifts 
in industry composition. A plausible interpretation  of this pattern of 
1. The union-oriented  (official)  unemployment  rate  was 5.7 (5.8) percent  in 1979,  7.8 
(7.1)  percent  in 1980,  8.0 (7.6)  percent  in 1981,  11.0  (9.7)  percent  in 1982,  10.6  (9.6)  percent 
in 1983,  and  7.6 (7.5)  percent  in 1984. Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  603 
facts is that the growth in the potential cost advantage of operating 
without a union during  the 1970s  and the apparent  persistence of that 
advantage  encouraged  the development  of viable nonunion  enterprises, 
which  now pose a serious  threat  to the union  sector. Insofar  as nonunion 
substitutes for union goods and services have become more readily 
available, this growth in nonunion competition seems likely to have 
increased  the elasticity of demand  for union labor, a change, standard 
models suggest, that should lead a union that values both wages and 
employment  to reduce its wage demands.  Richard  Freeman  and James 
Medoff have provided  some cross-sectional  evidence that union wage 
premiums are larger in heavily organized industries.2  While it goes 
beyond their findings  to say that an increase in nonunion  competition 
should lead to a relative slowing in the rate of growth  in union wages, 
that proposition  is consistent with their results. Moreover, insofar as 
unions  now face greater  obstacles to organizing  new units  than  they did 
in the past, one would  expect the threat of nonunion  competition  to have 
increased  even in cases where the nonunion  share of employment  has 
not risen  much,  particularly  in industries  with  low barriers  to entry. Had 
the intensity of nonunion  competition  been taken into account in the 
wage growth equations that underlie  table 2, something  that it would 
admittedly  not have been trivial to do, predicted  union wage growth 
would surely  have been closer to actual  union  wage growth. 
Mitchell  also regards  the spread  of wage concessions to an increasing 
number  of industries  as evidence  of a shift  in  union  wage-setting  behavior. 
This spread,  however, is less dramatic  than  table  5 might  suggest;  fewer 
than 5 percent of all concession settlements made during 1983, and a 
similar  percentage  of all concession settlements  made  during  1984  or the 
first  half  of 1985,  actually  represented  a "spread." The rest occurred  in 
industries  that  had  already  experienced  some concession activity  during 
1981  or 1982.3  The factors that explain  early concession activity would 
appear  to explain  most subsequent  concession activity  as well. 
Whether  present union wage moderation  is attributable  to a shift in 
the union wage determination  process or to economic developments, 
union wage increases have indeed been quite moderate  over the past 
2. See Richard  B. Freeman  and James L. Medoff, "The Impact  of the Percentage 
Organized on Union and Nonunion Wages,"  Review of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 63 
(November  1981),  pp. 561-72. 
3. Mitchell  kindly  supplied  me with  these numbers. 604  Brookings Papers on Economic Activitv, 2:1985 
few years; what can we expect over the next few years?  The answer  to 
this question will depend both on the features of existing multiyear 
contracts and on the pattern of new settlements. As an aside, I was 
rather  surprised  by Mitchell's  evidence that  concession agreements  had 
not abandoned  the multiyear  framework  and  in fact were almost  as long 
on average  as nonconcession  agreements.  This suggests  that  the unions 
signing  these agreements  generally  saw  themselves  to be accommodating 
lasting shifts in the economic environment,  rather  than purely short- 
term  difficulties. 
Mitchell's  examination  of the  features  of recently  negotiated  collective 
bargaining  agreements  focuses on the emergence  of fixed bonus plans 
and two-tier wage structures. It should perhaps be emphasized that 
fewer than 15 percent of collective bargaining  agreements currently 
contain  either  a fixed  bonus plan  or a two-tier  wage scheme. Moreover, 
it remains  to be seen whether  these features  are retained  in subsequent 
bargaining  rounds.  Given the internal  political  problems  that a two-tier 
wage system seems sure to cause for any union, I would expect these 
schemes to be short-lived. 
Certain  features  built  into current  contracts  will work to raise future 
wage increases relative to current  wage increases. As Mitchell notes, 
the ratio of average  annual  life-of-contract  wage increases to first-year 
increases  in major  collective bargaining  agreements  has risen markedly 
in the past few years. Contracts  used to be decidedly  front-loaded;  BLS 
data in various issues  of  Current Wage Developments  show  that the 
ratio of annual average life-of-contract  to first-year wage increases 
averaged  0.79 between 1970  and 1979.  That  ratio  rose from  more  or less 
normal  levels of 0.75 in 1980  and 0.81 in 1981  to 0.95 in 1982, 1.08 in 
1983, and 1.00 in 1984. These figures could be misleading  insofar as 
increases  under  COLA  clauses are  not included;  however, BLS data  for 
non-COLA  contracts  exhibit  a similar  pattern.  The ratio  of first-year  to 
average  annual  life-of-contract  wage increases  for non-COLA  contracts 
rose from  a roughly  normal  level of 0.88 in 1982  to 1.13  in 1983  and 1.30 
in 1984.  The findings  in table 2 that actual 1984  median  first-year  union 
wage adjustments  fell 3.2 percentage points short of the predicted 
adjustment,  while actual 1984  median  effective union  wage adjustments 
fell only 1.5 percentage  points short, are consistent with the shift away 
from  front-loaded  contracts.  The evidence suggests that deferred  wage 
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to first-year  wage increases under  the same contracts  than in the past, 
thus contributing  relatively  more  to effective union  wage growth. 
My  agreement  with  Mitchell's  conclusion  that  we can  expect moderate 
union  wage  increases  over  the  next  few years  rests  more  on an  assessment 
of the  underlying  economic  factors  than  on an  analysis  of specific  contract 
provisions.  The heavily unionized  industries  appear  to be plagued  by a 
variety  of problems,  and  unionized  enterprises  generally  are  increasingly 
threatened  by nonunion  competition.  All this suggests that union wage 
settlements  will remain  moderate  for the foreseeable  future. 
General Discussion 
Both Robert  Gordon  and Charles  Schultze expressed concern about 
a possible  problem  in  the  wage  growth  equations  underlying  the  predicted 
wage changes in table 2 of Daniel Mitchell's paper. Actual first-year 
union wage adjustments  are below predicted  adjustments  in every year 
since 1980, and actual overall union wage adjustments  are below pre- 
dicted adjustments  in every year since 1981,  even though  1980  and 1981 
are generally  considered  to be prior  to the conicession  period. 
Martin  Baily viewed the spread in concession activity from a few 
sectors in 1981  to many sectors in 1984-85, documented  in table 5, as 
fairly  persuasive  evidence that the recent concessions cannot  be linked 
solely to cyclical conditions;  if the concessions were simply a cyclical 
phenomenon,  the number  of sectors affected would have risen through 
1983, then fallen off. John Shoven wondered whether the apparent 
continuance and spread of concessions is in part a reflection of the 
staggered  timing of contract expiration  dates; a one-time shock that 
affected the terms agreed  upon at the next regularly  scheduled  renego- 
tiation  of each contract  might  produce  a pattern  similar  to that in table 
5. 
Much  of the discussion  focused on the relationship  between industry 
conditions  and  industry  wages. Baily noted  that  the observed  constancy 
of wage differentials  might be the result of institutional  rigidities  that 
prevent wages from adjusting,  but alternatively  might  indicate a labor 
market where mobility costs were low,  so that changes in industry 
conditions would produce movements of workers rather  than adjust- 
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agreements  contain  many  provisions  designed  to accommodate  shifts  in 
labor demand, so  that only shifts in labor supply require contract 
renegotiation. The fact that concessions have not been limited to 
industries affected by deregulation  or foreign competition provides 
evidence that shifts in labor supply conditions rather than shifts in 
product  market  conditions  motivated  the wage freezes and  cuts. 
William  Nordhaus was struck by the fact that the union-nonunion 
wage differential  had declined only about 3 percentage  points between 
1982 and 1985, in spite of the highly adverse conditions faced by the 
heavily  unionized  industries.  He reported  that  his own work  on industry 
wage growth  suggested  that  industries  subject  to deregulation  or foreign 
competition  had not experienced slower wage growth than industries 
sheltered from those pressures, at least through 1984. In Nordhaus's 
view, these results provide evidence of the surprising  stubbornness  of 
wage differentials. Baily noted that determining  whether or not a 
particular  industry  had been affected by foreign competition  could be 
quite a  subtle matter. As  an example, he mentioned the chemical 
industry,  which has been significantly  affected by foreign competition 
even though  import  penetration  in the industry  itself is low. What  has 
happened is  that foreign competition in apparel manufacturing  has 
reduced the domestic demand for synthetic fibers produced by the 
chemical industry. Lawrence Summers  echoed Nordhaus's view that 
wage structures  are surprisingly  stubborn;  in his own work  on nonunion 
wage differentials,  he has found that the cross-industry  relative wage 
structure  displays remarkable  stability over five- to ten-year periods, 
even in the face of quite  different  growth  rates across industries. 
Mitchell  noted that  the employment  figures  cited by Katharine  Abra- 
ham in her formal comments, showing that employment  in unionized 
industries  was lower in both 1983 and 1984 than it had been in 1979, 
obscured  the fact that  most of the employment  declines  in the unionized 
industries  had  already  occurred  by the fourth  quarter  of 1982,  the trough 
of the recession; after 1982, things generally began to improve. He 
questioned  whether  union  workers  who had  lost theirjobs  in 1982  would 
exert much influence  on union wage settlements  reached  a year or two 
years later. Mitchell  also pointed  to table 9 of the paper,  which reports 
estimated  wage growth  rates for largely  unionized  production  workers 
and largely nonunionized  clerical workers working  for manufacturing 
employers  in ten metropolitan  areas.  Between 1975  and 1979,  the growth 
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nonunionized  clerical workers' wages; between 1982 and 1984, the 
pattern  was reversed. Mitchell noted that product market  conditions 
cannot explain this relative slowing in the rate of union wage growth, 
since the two groups whose wages enter this comparison  work in the 
same establishments,  and he argued  that this was additional  evidence 
for his view that something  beyond industry  conditions had affected 
recent  union  wage settlements. 
Several  participants  commented  on the growth  of the union-nonunion 
wage differential  during  the 1970s. Gordon noted that the growth in 
wages in the heavily  unionized  U.S. manufacturing  sector exceeded the 
trend  rate  of growth  in productivity  from  the 1960s  onward;  indeed, the 
excess of wage growth over productivity  growth was larger in U.S. 
manufacturing  than in that of any of the European  countries. Michael 
Wachter  reported  that  work he has done with Peter  Linneman  based on 
Current  Population Survey data  from  1973  through  1984  shows a system- 
atic negative relationship  between the union wage premium  within an 
industry  and employment  growth  in the same industry.  Thus Wachter 
finds it puzzling  that union wage premiums  have not shrunk  more than 
they have;  even many  of the recent  concession settlements,  he observed, 
have involved temporary  wage postponements  rather  than permanent 
wage reductions. Stanley Fischer urged  that the recent slowing in the 
rate  of union  wage  growth  not be viewed  as a lowering  of "wage norms," 
thought of in terms of rates of increase; a more economic approach 
would be to model recent developments as an overshooting of union 
wage levels in the 1970s  that  has to be worked  off now. 
James  Duesenberry  took  the  position  that  factors  such  as deregulation, 
foreign competition, and nonunion competition are likely to have an 
important  effect on union wage growth, but he went on to note the 
existence of case-by-case evidence of a major shift in the political 
environment  of the collective bargaining  process. Employers  now de- 
mand and receive wage concessions they would never have expected 
ten years earlier. For example, employers today are quite likely to 
receive public support  for replacing strikers with other workers; ten 
years ago, strikebreakers  would have been termed  scabs and their use 
widely disapproved.  However, rather  than characterizing  the effect of 
these exogenous  shifts  in  the collective bargaining  environment  as a shift 
in the wage norm,  Duesenberry  argued  for the incorporation  of political 
factors  in economic models  of wage-setting  behavior. 
Baily took the fact that  wage concessions were occurring  in conjunc- 608  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
tion with a reduced level of strike activity as evidence that there has 
been a retreat  on the workers'  side of the collective bargaining  table. He 
argued that if the recent wage concessions were attributable  to  a 
management  hardening,  as some popular  discussion  has suggested,  one 
would  have expected concessions to be won only with  an increase  in the 
number  of strikes. 
Shoven noted that two-tier wage schemes offer only a temporary 
slowing  in the rate  of wage  growth.  Under  a temporary  two-tier  scheme, 
an initial slowing in the rate of wage growth will be followed by more 
rapid  wage growth  as workers  on the bottom  tier catch up with those on 
the top tier;  even under  a permanent  two-tier  system, wage growth  will 
be slowed only during  the period when new workers are entering  the 
second tier, though  that  period  might  last for some time. 